University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2007

Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law
Adam B. Cox

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Adam B. Cox, "Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law ," 74 University of Chicago Law Review 1671
(2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law
Adam B. Coxt

The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession
with judicial deference. The foundational doctrine of constitutional
immigration law-the "plenary power" doctrine-is centrally con-

cerned with such deference.' Under the doctrine's earliest incarnation,
the Supreme Court treated a challenge to a federal immigration policy
excluding Chinese immigrants as nearly nonjusticiable, writing that
the federal government's decisions about how to regulate immigration
were "conclusive upon the judiciary."2 Even in the modern constitutional era, the Supreme Court has invoked the plenary power to justify watered-down review of gender classifications in the immigration
code.' And some lower courts have suggested that the plenary power
precludes any judicial scrutiny of immigration decisions affecting arriving immigrants.'
This century-old doctrine has been augmented by developments
in administrative law that often obligate judges to defer to agencies'
factual and legal judgments. The Chevron doctrine is perhaps the bestknown strand of these developments. Under Chevron, courts must
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
provisions, even if the court disagrees with those interpretations.' Sister doctrines in administrative law counsel courts to defer to factual
6
determinations by agencies as well.

f Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to
Ahilan Arulanantham, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, and Adam Samaha for helpful comments. Thanks also to Kit Slack and Sarah Waxman for excellent research assistance.
1 See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship,Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 Cal L Rev 373,381-84
(2004).
2
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581,606 (1889).
3 See, for example, Fiallov Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977).
4
See, for example, Jean v Nelson, 727 F2d 957,964 (11th Cir 1984) (en banc):
[T]here are apparently no limitations on the power of the federal government to determine
what classes of aliens will be permitted to enter the United States or what procedures will
be used to determine their admissibility. . .. Aliens may therefore be denied admission on
grounds that would be constitutionally impermissible or suspect in the context of domestic
legislation.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837,843 (1984).
See, for example, Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc v NLRB, 522 US 359, 366 (1998)
(requiring courts to defer to agency fact findings that are supported by "substantial evidence on
the record as a whole").
5
6
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Taken together, these constitutional traditions and administrative
law trends would appear to make it inevitable that federal courts will
passively accept administrative judgments on immigration matters.'
Yet Judge Posner's recent immigration jurisprudence flips this foundational premise on its head: his immigration opinions exhibit extremely
searching review. Rather than reflecting constitutional or administrative law deference, his opinions treat immigration authorities with
great skepticism. Moreover, Posner's lack of deference is far from
idiosyncratic. Today a growing number of federal judges review decisions by the immigration courts with apparent skepticism.8 In fact, the
trend is significant enough to count as an important-though often
overlooked- thread of modern immigration jurisprudence.
What might account for this unexpected skepticism? In this short
Essay commemorating Judge Posner's twenty-fifth year on the bench,
I want to suggest two possibilities. The first has to do with democracy,
and focuses on the relationship between Congress and the President
in the immigration arena. The second has more to do with institutional
competence, and focuses on the relationship between federal judges
and the administrative immigration courts. Part I introduces the first
theory, and Part 1I the second.
I. NONDELEGATION NORMS AND IMMIGRATION LAW

In order to make sense of Judge Posner's unusual treatment of
immigration courts, it is helpful to start with one possible source of
that treatment-the Constitution itself. At first glance, it might seem
counterintuitive to look to the Constitution as a potential source of
judicial skepticism, given what I described above as constitutional
immigration law's preoccupation with judicial deference in the immigration arena. But this longstanding focus on the role of the judiciary
has obscured a different separation of powers issue-a nondelegation
concern -that might help explain Judge Posner's skepticism.
Constitutional immigration law has long been concerned with
separation of powers problems. These issues are at the center of the
immigration plenary power doctrine, which in its classic formulation
requires that courts give great deference to political branch decisions
about immigration policy and enforcement. Plenary power doctrine
7 And, in fact, several prominent administrative deference cases decided by the Supreme
Court have been immigration cases. See, for example, INS v Aguirre-Aguirre,526 US 415, 425
(1999) (extending Chevron beyond the rulemaking context by holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals should be accorded Chevron deference when it interprets statutory terms in the
context of case-by-case adjudication).
8 See, for example, Chen v DOJ, 426 F3d 104, 115 (2d Cir 2005); Fiadjoe v Attorney General,
411 F3d 135, 154-55 (3d Cir 2005); Lopez-Umanzor v Gonzales, 405 F3d 1049,1054 (9th Cir 2005).
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thus focuses on the distribution of authority between the judiciary and
the political branches of the federal government. For all this attention
to the constitutional distribution of authority between courts and the
political branches, however, immigration courts and commentators
have consistently overlooked a second separation of powers issue: the
difficult question of how immigration power is distributed within the
political branches, between Congress and the executive generally, or
more specifically between Congress and administrative agencies. For
that reason, they have also failed to ask what role, if any, courts should
play in enforcing that distribution of power.
Constitutional immigration law provides little guidance about the
distribution of immigration authority between Congress and the executive. The Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that immigration power is distributed within the political branches in the same
fashion as most other lawmaking powers. But it is far from clear that
immigration is like other areas. In most other areas, Article I gives
Congress clear supremacy with respect to lawmaking. Immigration
law, however, is nothing like this; the constitutional source of power to
make immigration law has always been contested and uncertain.
While Article I confers on Congress power to establish a "uniform
rule of naturalization,"' the Supreme Court has not read this provision
as the sole source of federal authority over immigration. Instead, the
Court has for over a century made conflicting and ambiguous pronouncements about the source of federal immigration authority.
Sometimes the Court has stated that the immigration power derives
from an extraconstitutional source-from principles of international
law, or from the foundational attributes of sovereignty."o On other occasions the Court has indicated that the immigration power is part and
parcel of the foreign relations power." And, to round things out, the
Court has from time to time suggested that the immigration power is
entailed by the combination of a number of enumerated powers.12
9 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4.
1o See, for example, Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 711 (1893) ("The right to
exclude or to expel all aliens ... [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and
independent nation."); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581, 603 (1889) (noting that the
power to exclude aliens "is an incident of every independent nation").
11 See, for example, Fong Yue Ting, 149 US at 705 (noting that "the constitution [sic] has
committed the entire control of international relations," which includes the power to exclude and
expel noncitizens, to the national government); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US at 605-06
(stating that the federal government is "invested with power over all the foreign relations of the
country," and therefore has the power to "preserve [the nation's] independence, and give security
against foreign aggression and encroachment ... whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us").
12 The enumerated powers suggested by the Court include the Treatymaking Clause, the
War Powers Clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Republican Government Clause, and
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Confusion about the source of immigration power creates substantial uncertainty about the distribution of that authority between
Congress and the executive. Nonetheless, there are hints in the case
law that courts are sometimes uncomfortable with the role that the
executive branch immigration agencies play in formulating immigration policy. Article III judges, including Posner on occasion, seem to
suggest that some of the interpretive authority claimed by the immigration agencies should be reserved for Congress. Thus, I suggest that
the surprising judicial skepticism directed at immigration courts might
best be understood as reflecting a nondelegation norm.
Classically, nondelegation principles in constitutional law prohibit
Congress from delegating lawmaking power to the executive branch.
The nondelegation doctrine is essentially a dead letter today-if any
such general doctrine really ever existed." But nondelegation principles are still alive and well in particular contexts. As Cass Sunstein has
pointed out, for example, courts today sometimes restrict delegation
by refusing to apply standard deference doctrines in situations where
there is reason to think that Congress, rather than an administrative
agency, should be forced to make a particular policy choice." Sunstein
identifies a number of interpretive canons-which he calls "nondelegation canons" -that override default delegation rules in this way. He
argues that these canons serve as a kind of "democracy-forcing minimalism": they are "designed to ensure that certain choices are made
by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree."" The idea of
nondelegation canons links the protection of individual rights or other
important interests to questions of appropriate institutional design. In
other words, the theory focuses on promoting democratic legitimacy
or accountability by selecting the institution with the better democratic pedigree. (We might therefore contrast this strategy with theories
of subsidiary delegation in administrative law, which focus on promoting rule of law virtues by constrainingthe decisionmaking institution.")
Why might courts apply a nondelegation norm in immigration
cases? Do those cases implicate the kinds of choices that courts might
the Naturalization Clause. See, for example, Fong Yue Ting, 149 US at 712-13; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US at 604.
13 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interringthe Nondelegation Doctrine,69 U Chi
L Rev 1721, 1722 (2002).
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,67 U Chi L Rev 315,316 (2000).
15 Id at 317.
16 On issues of subsidiary delegation, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L J 1399
(2000). For a discussion of the relationship between institution-constraining rules and institutionselecting rules in a different context, see Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5
Election L J 412,413-18 (2006).
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conclude should be made by Congress rather than administrative actors? To answer this question, it is helpful to recognize that one of
Sunstein's nondelegation canons makes an occasional appearance in
immigration jurisprudence: the rule of lenity." For more than half a
century, courts have periodically invoked the rule of lenity in immigration cases." As in the criminal context (where the rule of lenity is
more frequently invoked), courts wield this canon of statutory construction in immigration cases to interpret ambiguities against harsher
punishment-which means against deportation or exclusion, and in
favor of the noncitizen. The effect is to restrict delegation by denying
deference to contrary agency interpretations of immigration provisions. If Congress wants the provisions to be interpreted against noncitizens, it must make that policy choice itself; the decision cannot be
left to an administrative agency.
The canon itself, however, cannot be the reason for judicial skepticism in immigration cases. The immigration rule of lenity, like its
counterpart in the criminal arena, is almost inevitably invoked only in
the breach by federal courts. Moreover, while the rule of lenity does
reflect concern about the harshness of deportation, this antipenal sentiment is certainly not unique to immigration law. Thus, the sentiment
does not fully explain whether there is something distinctive about
immigration law qua immigration law that would support a nondelegation norm in this arena.
Still, the rule of lenity is helpful in highlighting the possibility that
there might be some aspect of immigration cases that implicates the
kind of choices courts could want to reserve to Congress. Is there such
a feature that might justify invoking the democracy-reinforcing rubric
of nondelegation? Perhaps the most plausible candidate would be the
claim that immigration decisions are distinctive because they concern
the allocation of the primary good of membership within a democracy.
17 In addition to the rule of lenity, the canon of constitutional avoidance-another of Sunstein's nondelegation canons-is sometimes invoked in immigration cases. See Sunstein, 67 U
Chi L Rev at 316 (cited in note 14). That canon instructs courts to, whenever possible, avoid
interpreting a statute in a manner that would raise serious questions about the statute's constitutionality. Accordingly, courts applying the canon would refuse to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that raises constitutional questions-even if that interpretation would ordinarily
receive Chevron deference. In this fashion, the canon operates as a nondelegation mechanism.
For a discussion of the long history of courts applying the constitutional avoidance canon in the

immigration arena, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 Yale L J 545, 560-73 (1990).

18 See, for example, Bonetti v Rogers, 356 US 691, 699 (1958) ("When Congress leaves to
the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity."); Fong Haw Tan v Phelan,333 US 6, 10 (1948); Delgadillo v Carmichael,

332 US 388, 391 (1947). For perhaps the earliest hint of the lenity idea in immigration jurisprudence, see Yamataya v Fisher,189 US 86,99-101 (1903).
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Courts might conclude that an institution with a stronger democratic
pedigree than the Board of Immigration Appeals should make those
membership-allocation decisions. Immigration decisions-decisions to
admit or deport immigrants- often implicate membership in the political and constitutional community in at least two different ways.
First, each particular decision by the Board resolves the membership
status of an individual noncitizen by determining whether the noncitizen's conduct should or should not make her deportable, excludable,
or so forth. Second, the Board's decisions in the aggregate allocate
membership across cases by interpreting the asylum requirements, the
criminal deportation provisions, and so on to elaborate a set of rules
that regulate the extension and deprivation of various forms of membership to existing and potential immigrants. This feature of immigration policy has led political theorists like Michael Walzer to argue that
such decisions are among the most important we make: "The primary
good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human
community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all
our other distributive choices."9
On this account, judicial skepticism in immigration cases is partly
about democracy and delegation -or, more specifically, about the kind
of democratic processes the courts demand be used to make some set
of sensitive membership judgments involving immigration.0
To be sure, there are a few problems with this interpretation of
the case law. The first is conceptual. The idea of "membership" is a bit
slippery; a quick survey of the vast literature on citizenship confirms
this much. 1 For that reason, it might be difficult to define the boundaries of a principle that prefers Congress to make interpretive decisions
that affect the distribution of "membership" in the national political
community. Some might claim that other sorts of decisions-say, government decisions that allocate educational benefits, or welfare benefits, or access to health care-also implicate "membership" in a sense
19 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice:A Defense of Pluralism and Equality31 (Basic Books
1983).
20
While I have focused above on the distribution of authority between Congress and the
executive branch immigration agencies, this democracy-reinforcing account could, of course, also
focus on the distribution of immigration authority within the executive branch. See generally
Elena Kagan and David J. Barron, Chevron's NondelegationDoctrine, 2001 Sup Ct Rev 201. One
might complain, for example, that the immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals
do not deserve deference because they lack the democratic pedigree of say, the Attorney General or perhaps the President. The Supreme Court suggested such an intra-executive branch
nondelegation principle in Hampton v Mow Sun Wong, 426 US 88,101-05 (1976).
21
See generally, for example, Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton 2006); Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for
Inclusion (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) (Harvard 1991); James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship,1608-1870 (North Carolina 1978).
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sufficient to require congressional rather than agency decisionmaking.
One could try to avoid this difficulty by acknowledging that the theory
picking out immigration decisions is partial (in the sense that it may
not reach all decisions that bear importantly on membership). But
that would not fully resolve the conceptual issues because circumscribing the boundaries of what constitutes an "immigration" decision
is itself somewhat tricky.
In addition to this conceptual difficulty, there is a more serious
problem. Even if there is consensus that, for example, the distribution
of membership is implicated by the basic decision about what conduct
should make a noncitizen deportable, one would still have to justify
the conclusion that Congress should not be permitted to delegate
these decisions to administrative agencies.2 This presents a tough
problem of democratic and constitutional theory. But it is a problem
more generally with existing discussions of nondelegation canons.
They provide an interpretive account of why the judiciary might require Congress to make certain decisions, but they generally do not
develop a thoroughgoing defense of courts' decision to prefer Congress. For example, while the nondelegation idea is an intuitively attractive account of the canon of constitutional avoidance, more work
would need to be done to justify fully the conclusion that constitutionally sensitive issues must be decided by Congress rather than administrative agencies ultimately accountable to the President. In this
short Essay, however, my ambition is more modest. I want simply to
suggest that the nondelegation idea might, as a descriptive matter,

22
There is an additional complication here: one would also have to sort out the question
whether the power is Congress's to delegate in the first place. As I explained above, the Constitution itself does not contain much guidance about how immigration lawmaking authority is distributed within the political branches. Scholars have sometimes suggested that the immigration
power is clearly derived exclusively from Article I, § 8, which gives Congress the power to regulate naturalization. See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum L Rev 2097, 2178 (2004). But the Supreme
Court has never clearly specified the source of immigration power, and has on occasion suggested that the executive might have independent constitutional authority over immigration
policy. See, for example, Knauff v Shaughnessy, 338 US 537, 542 (1950):

The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not
alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation. When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of
aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent executive power.
To the extent that the executive is vested with an independent source of power over immigration, it becomes less clear how one should think about issues of delegation and nondelegation in
the immigration arena.
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provide an attractive reinterpretation of the surprising absence of ad,23
ministrative deference in many immigration cases.
If nondelegation norms are at work, there remains one final difficulty. Nondelegation principles are designed to promote congressional
decisionmaking, not to liberate judicial decisionmaking. A fairly common approach to constraining such decisionmaking in individual cases
is for judges implementing a nondelegation norm to agree upon an
interpretive default that they enforce in the absence of a clear decision by Congress. In constitutional avoidance cases, the interpretive
default is the reading that does not raise constitutional questions. In
rule of lenity cases, the interpretive default is the reading that narrows
(rather than expands) the scope of criminal liability. In immigration
cases, courts could similarly adopt an interpretive default. The rule of
lenity's history in immigration jurisprudence might suggest one: reading
statutes to protect the existing membership status of a noncitizen, absent a clear decision by Congress to strip the noncitizen of her status.
That is not to say, of course, that such a default is a necessary corollary to an immigration nondelegation norm. Judges could also enforce the norm by employing ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. And in fact, that approach is more consistent with the actual
practice of immigration review by federal courts. Posner and other
judges do not typically construe ambiguity in the Immigration and
Nationality Act in favor of noncitizens when they refuse to defer to
the immigration courts. Instead, they make their own judgment about
the meaning of the relevant statute. 4 While this second approach
might appear to shift some measure of interpretive authority from
agencies to judges, rather than to Congress, the appearance is somewhat misleading. Judges inevitably must play some role in order to
enforce a nondelegation norm. When judges implement the norm by
employing an interpretive default, that role is perhaps obscured. But it
is judges, of course, who establish the interpretive default -as well as
decide when to invoke it. That ordinary statutory interpretation leaves
23 This theory might also help explain why, as Hiroshi Motomura has documented, the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance has so often been applied in immigration cases where the
constitutional concerns are weak or nonexistent. See Motomura, 100 Yale L J at 545 (cited in
note 17). The aggressive application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine might simply be an
artifact of courts trying to shoehorn their delegation concerns about membership decisions into
an existing doctrine that operates to prevent delegation.
24 Mei v Ashcroft, 393 F3d 737 (7th Cir 2004), provides a good example. In that case Posner
concluded that it would be meaningless to defer to the immigration court's interpretation of the
deportation provision covering "crime[s] involving moral turpitude," but still interpreted the
ambiguous provision to cover Mei's conviction. Id at 739. Rather than construing the provision
narrowly and forcing Congress to make the decision about whether the provision reached as far
as the immigration court had concluded, he resolved the ambiguity about the outer limits of the
provision's coverage himself. See id at 740-42.
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some room for judgment, therefore, does not undermine the possibility that such an interpretive exercise is part of a nondelegationinspired exercise by a court.
In short, judicial skepticism of agency action in modern immigration cases may be in part about the distribution of power between
Congress and the executive, a separation of powers problem long
overlooked by immigration jurisprudence and scholarship.
II. AGENCY INCOMPETENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Nondelegation norms may not be the only explanation for judicial skepticism of the immigration agencies. In recent cases, Posner's
(and other judges') skepticism appears to stem at least in part from
dissatisfaction with the decisionmaking process within the agency. In
such cases, Posner does not directly challenge administrative law's
conventional wisdom that an agency with primary responsibility for
implementing a statute should receive substantial deference from federal courts when it discharges that responsibility. Instead, he concludes
that deference is not due because the immigration agencies are failing
to discharge this duty when they decide immigration cases. On this
account, therefore, the exceptional treatment of immigration cases concerns the distribution of interpretive authority between the judiciary
and the executive, rather than between the executive and Congress.
In recent years, Posner has more and more frequently concluded
that both the immigration judges who conduct deportation proceedings and the Board of Immigration Appeals that reviews decisions of
the immigration judges are inept. Time and time again he has complained that "the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice."26
Among other rebukes, he has labeled the immigration courts' deci-

25
Moreover, it is clear that one cannot fit this apparent lack of deference into standard
administrative law doctrines. As I noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the Board of
Immigration Appeals's interpretations of immigration statutes are due Chevron deference. See
INS v Aguirre-Aguirre,526 US 415,425 (1999). Even putting aside this holding, the immigration
courts' interpretations seem to qualify for deference under most conventional accounts of United
States v Mead, 533 US 218 (2001)-accounts that focus on whether an agency interpretation
carries the "force of law" (the immigration courts' interpretations clearly do), as well as accounts
that emphasize procedural formality.
26
Benslimane v Gonzales, 430 F3d 828, 830 (7th Cir 2005). See also Pasha v Gonzales, 433
F3d 530, 531 (7th Cir 2005) ("At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oftexpressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the
Board of Immigration Appeals .... The performance of these federal agencies is too often inadequate. This case presents another depressing example.").

HeinOnline -- 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1679 2007

1680

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:1671

sions arbitrary," unreasoned,a irrational," inconsistent, and uninformed."
Posner's concerns about competence extend to the immigration
agencies' handling of both factual and legal questions. He has frequently found that immigration judges are uninformed about the factual questions they are charged with resolving or, even worse, that
they ignore available evidence and base factual findings on bald assertions. With respect to questions of law, Posner has reached similar conclusions. Consider his evaluation of the immigration courts in Mei v
Ashcroft." The case concerned whether the petitioner was deportable
for having committed a "crime involving moral turpitude." The
27
See, for example, Benslimane, 430 F3d at 832 (chastising the immigration judge for "arbitrarily denying a motion for a continuance").
28 See, for example, Hor v Gonzales, 421 F3d 497,500 (7th Cir 2005) ("In short, there is no
reasoned basis for the immigration judge's conclusion, which was based ... [on] unsubstantiated
conjectures."); Joshi v Ashcroft, 389 F3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir 2004) ("A decision that resolves a
critical factual question without mention of the principal evidence cannot be considered adequately reasoned."); Mamedov v Ashcroft, 387 F3d 918, 919 (7th Cir 2004) ("As in a number of
recent [immigration] cases, the opinion by the immigration judge ... is unreasoned."); Lian v
Ashcroft, 379 F3d 457, 461-62 (7th Cir 2004) ("The immigration judge failed to give the issue a
responsible analysis. That is to put it mildly. Lian's counsel presented a huge mass of evidence
bearing on the only issue in the case.... All this material (and more) was, so far as we can determine, completely ignored by the immigration judge.").
29
See, for example, Hor, 421 F3d at 501 ("To be entitled to deference, [an immigration
judge's] determination ... must rest on more than [an] implausible assertion backed up by no
facts."); lao v Gonzales, 400 F3d 530, 533 (7th Cir 2005) ("The immigration judge's opinion
cannot be regarded as reasoned; and there was no opinion by the Board of Immigration Appeals.... [The petitioner] is entitled to a rational analysis of the evidence by them."); Mengistu v
Ashcroft, 355 F3d 1044,1047 (7th Cir 2004) ("[A]s we tirelessly repeat,... an agency opinion that
fails to build a rational bridge between the record and the agency's legal conclusion cannot
survive judicial review."); Galina v INS, 213 F3d 955, 958 (7th Cir 2000) ("The Board's analysis
was woefully inadequate, indicating that it has not taken to heart previous judicial criticisms of
its performance in asylum cases.... The elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of
logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other cases.").
30 See, for example, Djouma v Gonzales, 429 F3d 685,687-88 (7th Cir 2005) (criticizing the
ad hoc way in which immigration judges determine the credibility of asylum applicants, and
taking the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to task for "fail[ing]
to provide the immigration judges and the members of the Board of Immigration Appeals with
any systematic guidance on the resolution of credibility issues in these cases").
31
See, for example, id at 688 ("The [immigration agencies] seem committed to case by case
adjudication in circumstances in which a lack of background knowledge denies the adjudicators
the cultural competence required to make reliable determinations of credibility."); Hor,421 F3d
at 500 (criticizing immigration judges deciding asylum cases for being woefully uninformed
about the conditions in the countries where the asylum claims arose); lao, 400 F3d at 533-34
(claiming that "[a] lack of familiarity with relevant foreign cultures" was a "disturbing feature" of
this case, as well as of many other immigration cases); Lian, 379 F3d at 459 (criticizing immigration judges for not being knowledgeable about foreign countries whose practices and laws are
relevant to the judges' determinations); Comollari v Ashcroft, 378 F3d 694, 696 (7th Cir 2004)
(criticizing an immigration judge in an asylum case for getting wrong the basic-and dispositive-fact of which government was in power in Albania in 1999).
32
393 F3d 737 (7th Cir 2004).
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threshold question was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals's
interpretation of this statutory term was due Chevron deference.
Judge Posner concluded that it would be meaningless to give deference to the Board:
Since Congress did not define "crime involving moral turpitude"
when it inserted the term in the immigration statute, ... it is rea-

sonable to suppose A la Chevron that Congress contemplated
that the agency charged with administering the statute would define the term, and specifically would tailor the definition to the
policies embodied in the immigration statutes. The Board of Immigration Appeals has done neither.... It is not deploying any
insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigra33
tion cases.
Moreover, Posner's concerns extend beyond issues of competence; he has often also questioned the immigration courts' impartiality. In asylum cases, for example, Posner has hinted that immigration
judges are unfairly predisposed against the asylum seekers whose petitions they are adjudicating.M He has suggested the same with respect
to criminal deportation cases. Many criminal deportation cases concern the question whether a noncitizen is deportable for having been
convicted of an "aggravated felony"-a statutory term of art under
the immigration laws.5 As with other statutory terms in the immigration statute, Posner has often rejected rather than deferred to the government's interpretation of the "aggravated felony" provision. A concern about bias seems to animate this lack of deference; in one recent
case, for example, he lamented that "[t]he only consistency that we can
see in the government's treatment of the meaning of 'aggravated felony' is that the alien always loses.""
33 Id at 739. See also Sahi v Gonzales, 416 F3d 587, 588 (7th Cir 2005) ("The primary responsibility for defining key terms in the immigration statute that the statutes themselves do not
define ... is that of the Board of Immigration Appeals as the Attorney General's delegate. The
Board has failed to discharge that responsibility.").
3
See, for example, Pramatarovv Gonzales, 454 F3d 764,766 (7th Cir 2006) (noting that the
immigration judge's questioning of the asylum seeker "was so harsh and rude as to suggest bias").
35 See 8 USC §H 1101(a)(43),1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
36 Gonzales-Gomez v Achim, 441 F3d 532, 535 (7th Cir 2006). Judge Posner's apparent
concern that the immigration courts in Gonzales-Gomez were acting partially-almost like
prosecutors rather than adjudicators-suggests a parallel to another context in which courts do
not afford Chevron deference: federal criminal prosecutions. Courts have never deferred to
interpretations of federal criminal law adopted by the Attorney General or her subordinate
United States Attorneys who are charged with enforcing federal criminal law. See generally Dan
M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal CriminalLaw?, 110 Harv L Rev 469 (1996) (arguing in
favor of deference in the federal criminal law context). There are some oft-overlooked similarities between immigration law and federal criminal law-regulatory areas that both involve large
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In short, across a broad spectrum of immigration cases, Judge
Posner has repeatedly suggested that there is something exceptional
(but not exceptionally good) about the immigration agencies and how
they resolve immigration cases. To be sure, Posner is not the only federal judge to reach this conclusion. For some time, a number of federal
appellate judges have suggested that the immigration courts are fundamentally incompetent, biased, or both. And this chorus has grown
louder in recent years, as a variety of "streamlining" procedures designed to expedite the processing of immigration cases has further
eroded the ability of immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals to devote sufficient resources to individual cases.
On this account, Judge Posner's skepticism in immigration cases
appears to be driven by a judgment about comparative institutional
competence. Such judgments are, of course, central to debates about
deference in administrative law." For example, Chevron deference is
often defended on the ground that administrative agencies have
greater expertise and more democratic accountability than courts. But
administrative law jurisprudence has generally made these judgments
of institutional competence wholesale rather than retail. In fact, that
was part of the point of Chevron-to create a general, transsubstantive doctrine of administrative deference to replace the more
ad hoc approach to deference that had previously characterized administrative law jurisprudence. That is not to say that the postChevron world is one with uniform deference to all forms of administrative decisionmaking. Far from it." But the doctrine does not generally authorize courts to decide whether deference is appropriate by
evaluating directly the competence of the administrative decisionenforcement agencies. Perhaps these similarities help explain Posner's concern about the impartiality of the immigration agencies.
37 See generally Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the
Board of Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures,16 Stan L & Policy Rev 481,

499-501 (2005) (summarizing the limitations placed on the Board of Immigration Appeals by
recent streamlining procedures); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal
Court? An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Recent Surge in Petitionsfor Review, 20 Georgetown Immig

L J 1,29-32 (2005) (discussing the criticisms of the streamlining procedures adopted since October 1999); Letter from Richard A. Posner to Senator Richard J. Durbin (Mar 15,2006) (concluding that "[tlhe Board's problem is that it is overwhelmed by appeals and thus cannot do an effective filtering job").
38 More generally, issues of comparative competence are central to questions about the
distribution of interpretive authority among different institutional actors in our constitutional
system. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty:An Institutional Theory of
Legal Interpretation(Harvard 2006).
39 See generally Mead, 533 US 218 (holding that Chevron deference applies only when

Congress intended the agency's interpretations to carry the force of law); Thomas W. Merrill and
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833 (2001) (discussing the types of
agency interpretations to which Chevron deference does not or should not apply).
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makers whose rulings are being reviewed." This, however, is precisely
what Judge Posner appears to be doing in his immigration jurisprudence. And it is this that makes his lack of deference to the legal and
factual determinations of the immigration courts so striking.
If this descriptive account is correct, what should we make of it?
We might question whether federal courts are really in a position to
make the judgment about agency competence that Judge Posner has
made about the immigration courts. But perhaps the federal courts,
which each year review more than ten thousand immigration court
decisions," are uniquely well positioned to make that determination.
In any event, if we assume that Posner has accurately concluded that
the immigration courts are incompetent, an important question remains: should a federal appellate judge respond to the incompetence
of the immigration courts by refusing to give deference to the agency's
factual and legal judgments-in other words, by creating a de facto
doctrine of administrative law exceptionalism for immigration law?
Posner never directly considers this question in his immigration
jurisprudence. But while he implicitly answers it in the affirmative,
several complicating factors make it quite difficult to identify the best
judicial response. On the side of Posner's immigration administrative
exceptionalism is one obviously important interest-the interest of
the individual noncitizens whose cases he reviews. After all, without
his skeptical review a number of people would likely have been
wrongly deported without a minimally acceptable adjudication of
their claims and, in several cases, in fairly clear contravention to the
requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Nonetheless, Posner is but one federal judge. However Herculean
his talents might be, he cannot personally decide more than a small
fraction of the immigration cases in the Seventh Circuit. And, of
course, he cannot decide any of the far greater numbers of immigration cases that flow through the federal circuits with far larger immi-

4
Note that, in one sense, Judge Posner's approach is somewhat more categorical than the
approach suggested by Mead. There the Court appears to contemplate adjusting deference on a
policy-by-policy basis to reflect the nuances of Congress's delegation decision. Here Judge Posner appears to make a rough judgment about the institutional competence of an entire administrative institution-the immigration courts-and then use that judgment to calibrate his level of
deference in all cases coming from that institution.
41

See Recent Case: Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration

Courts, 119 Harv L Rev 2596,2596 (2006) (noting that immigration appeals have "swollen in the
past five years from three percent to eighteen percent of all federal appeals"). See also Palmer,
Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 44-45 (cited in note 37) (discussing
monthly rates of filings).
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gration dockets.42 This highlights one potential problem-a coordination problem-with Posner's immigration exceptionalism.
As Adrian Vermeule and others have noted, the judiciary is a
"they," not an "it."4 For that reason, Posner's skeptical review of immigration agencies can only advance the interest of large numbers of
potential deportees if a sufficient number of federal judges adopt a
similar review strategy. Ordinarily, of course, federal judges coordinate
to a certain extent through the system of judicial precedent and oversight by the Supreme Court. But these usual means of coordination
are much less likely to work here than in some other contexts. As I
noted above, there is no ready doctrinal toehold in administrative law
jurisprudence for Posner's direct assessment of the immigration
courts' competence. Accordingly, his skeptical standard of review
stands outside the ordinary doctrinal framework for reviewing administrative decisions. And because it exists outside this framework, it is
more difficult for other federal courts to coordinate around it in the
way that they do around precedent. Perhaps even more important, its
extradoctrinal status makes it very unlikely to be adopted anytime
soon by the Supreme Court.
Putting aside the coordination issue, there is a more general difficulty with the immigration exceptionalism approach: it is not clear
whether, in the long run, it is better for deportees specifically or the
immigration adjudication system generally for federal courts to engage in skeptical, intensive review of the immigration courts. If the
administrative adjudication system is failing, there are at least three
ways to correct for its failures. The first is for federal courts to step
into the breach, as Posner has done. But it is unclear whether this is a
sustainable strategy-or whether it can ever be more than a marginally effective one-given the huge volume of immigration adjudication and the limited capacities of the federal judiciary.45

42 The Second and Ninth Circuits have by far the largest immigration dockets. These circuits each decide more than twice the number of cases decided by the average circuit. See
Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 44-45 (cited in note 37).
43 See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 549 (2005).
44 This possibility is a specific example of a more general concern about the role of courts
in promoting social and institutional change. For a discussion of the more general concern, see,
for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Chicago 1993).
45 This strategy is also limited by the fact that many noncitizens in immigration proceedings have difficulty seeking review of agency rulings-some because they are prohibited from
doing so by limitations on judicial review in the immigration code, some because they are unable
to pay the filing fees associated with judicial review, and some because they would have to remain in detention for a long period of time in order to pursue their claims in federal court.
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A second possibility is to persuade or coerce the immigration
agencies to improve their administrative adjudication system. Posner
has often in his opinions pressed the Attorney General to do just this.
Among others, he has pleaded for two particular improvements.
Sometimes he has suggested that the proper way for the Attorney
General to discharge his duty to interpret the immigration statute
would be to promulgate more rules defining the statute's key terms to
provide more guidance to immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals." At other times, Judge Posner has suggested changes
to the specificity of the policymaking action rather than its form: he
has begged the Board to lay down more rules-or at least more specific standards-to guide its own process of adjudication."
These reforms might go some distance towards improving the adjudication of immigration cases in the administrative system. Neither
would necessarily get at Posner's concerns about bias, but both might
alleviate some of his rule of law and arbitrariness concerns." This said,
it is unclear whether Posner's intensive oversight makes it more or less
likely that the agency will reform its adjudicatory process. His oversight might spur the agency by raising the cost of shoddy administrative adjudication. The immigration courts often must spend additional
resources to revisit decisions that have been overturned by appellate
courts, and the appellate court opinions themselves can be quite embarrassing to the agency (as many of Judge Posner's are). These costs might
have disciplining effects." On the other hand, the immigration agencies
might have less of an incentive to improve their adjudicatory processes
if greater oversight by Article III courts enables the agencies essentially
to outsource some of their adjudicatory effort. Some have suggested
that the Attorney General's "streamlining" regulations for the Board of

46 I leave to one side the question whether administrative law jurisprudence smiles or
frowns on judicial attempts to push administrative decisionmaking into a particular procedural
form-in this case the rulemaking process rather than agency adjudication.
47 See, for example, Djouma, 429 F3d at 687-88; Sahi, 416 F3d at 588-89; Mei, 393 F3d at 739.
48 These are, of course, concerns that have long animated the delegation debate in administrative law more generally. This highlights the way in which the two theories of Posner's immigration skepticism-the nondelegation theory and the immigration court incompetence theorytrack two threads of this delegation debate. One thread has focused on preventing certain delegations from Congress to the executive (and this thread is typically given the "nondelegation"
label), while the second thread has focused on promoting internal controls on delegation. See
note 16 and accompanying text.
49 Of course, the remand required by SEC v Chenery Corp, 318 US 80 (1943), when a
federal court invalidates an agency decision can cause delay and duplication of effort that is
costly for the noncitizen in deportation proceedings as well as for the immigration courts.
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Immigration Appeals have done just this, reducing the adjudicatory
burden on the agency by shifting that effort to federal courts."
The third way to correct for the perceived failing of the immigration courts is to persuade Congress to overhaul the structure of immigration adjudication." Here too, intensive oversight by federal courts
might either advance or retard such reform efforts. Federal court
judges might act as whistleblowers, providing valuable information to
Congress about agency incompetence. This information might be consumed directly by congressional oversight committees (particularly
when the judicial criticism comes from a prominent judge like Posner).
Or it might be used by immigrants' rights advocates to bolster the
credibility of their arguments to these oversight bodies. Still, intensive
oversight by federal courts might also alleviate the perceived need for
administrative reform. If federal courts are dedicating additional resources to police the immigration courts, Congress might conclude
that it is not worth investing its own energy to restructure that system
of adjudication. Moreover, efforts to encourage internal reform by the
agency and external reform by Congress might work at crosspurposes. If the efforts prompt agency reform that improves the adjudicative process at the margins, the marginal improvement might
make it less likely that Congress will jump in and undertake more
wide-ranging reforms.
Sometimes, however, it might be possible for a federal judge to
pursue all three of the above strategies simultaneously. In fact, it may
be that Judge Posner's scathing immigration jurisprudence has managed to do just this-to correct egregious errors in individual cases
(perhaps even setting off a cascade among other judges, who will
themselves step in and correct more errors); to embarrass the immigration agencies to an extent that increases the likelihood of internal
reform; and to. signal Congress about significant problems in the current system. Such a feat might not be possible in all situations or for
all judges, and for that reason it will not always be clear what a wellintentioned judge should do when confronted with an incompetent or
biased agency decisionmaking structure. But Judge Posner's conspicuous skepticism in immigration cases illustrates a role that the federal

5o See, for example, Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 31 (cited
in note 37).
51 Over the past several decades, there have been recurring calls for Congress to establish
an Article I immigration court much like the bankruptcy court system. See Peter J. Levinson, A
Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 Notre Dame L Rev 644, 644-45

(1980). Legislation to create such a court has been introduced in Congress several times. See, for
example, HR 3187, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (Aug 1, 1985); Immigration Court, 104th Cong, 2d Sess
(Sept 28, 1996), in 142 Cong Rec E1806-01 (Sept 28, 1996).
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judiciary might play in overseeing executive behavior-a role quite
different than that captured by Chevron and its progeny.
CONCLUSION

Judge Posner's striking skepticism of immigration courts might be
grounded in two quite different sources: nondelegation norms on the one
hand and institutional incompetence on the other. Drawing attention to
these possibilities is crucial to understanding his jurisprudence. More importantly, introducing these possibilities highlights more fundamental,
and largely unaddressed, questions about the institutional relationship
between Congress, the executive, and judiciary in the immigration arena.
Often these questions have been obscured by immigration scholarship's
obsession with the plenary power doctrine and ideas of immigration law's
exceptionalism. My goal here has been to illuminate-and promote conversation about-these oft-overlooked questions.
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